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Yang’s (2016) Tolerance Principle describes with incredible precision how many
exceptions the mechanisms of child language acquisition can tolerate to induce a
productive rule, and is a notable advance in the long-standing controversy as to the
amount of data necessary for the acquisition of language. The present contribution
addresses a different but related issue, that of the amount of data on variation in
languages needed by a linguist to develop a theory of language. Using as a model the
perennial question of how many languages should be considered to formulate a general
theory of language, I will show that discussions about the type and amount of data
needed for linguistic theorizing cannot be fruitful without taking into account the type
of linguistic theory and its goals. Moreover, the type of linguistic theory itself depends on
the way in which the object of study is conceived. I propose that the two main types
of current linguistic theory (functionalism and formalism) correlate broadly to different
scientific methods: the inductive one (which proceeds from languages to language) and
the deductive one (which proceeds from language to languages), respectively. My aim
is to show that the type of data that can falsify a certain linguistic theory is different
depending on whether the theory is deductive or inductive. That is, the two types of
theory have a different “tolerance threshold” regarding the sparseness of data. Hence,
the expectation of progress that new sources of data on language variation can provide
for linguistic theory should be modulated according to the objectives and assumptions
of each language theory.
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INTRODUCTION: TWO WAYS OF RELATING DATA AND THEORY
It is impossible to predict whether the rapid development of new sources of data on linguistic
variation, as a result of the expanding breadth and scope of information technologies, will have
a comparably large impact on linguistic theory (and especially on syntactic theory). In principle,
it seems safe to say that obtaining new evidence can only be beneficial for any science. I do not
intend in to question this general statement in any way, yet I would like to qualify it in the context
of contemporary linguistic theory. My goal is to show that the degree of the impact of these new
sources of information will be different depending on the type of linguistic theory involved: the
impact can be notable for linguistic traditions based on the inductive method, but will surely have a
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more modest effect (although not necessarily an irrelevant one)
for traditions that adopt a deductive methodology.
The remainder of this section deals with the specific senses
in which I use the expressions inductive model and deductive
model and how both models are related in general to the
data that they use. In the following section Introduction:
Two Ways of Relating Data and Theory consider how these
models are instantiated in contemporary theories of linguistic
diversity. The How Many Languages do We Need to Formulate
a Theory of the Faculty of Language? section discusses ways
in which the two theoretical models diverge markedly in their
conceptions of the object of study, using an analogy with
research on the role of environmental stimuli in language
acquisition to justify my claim that the two models have
different “tolerance thresholds” regarding data on linguistic
variation.
The relationship between data and theory in science is
different depending on whether an inductive or a deductive
methodology is employed. Following (Dougherty’s, 1994)
characterization, we can say that in an inductive model there
exists a certain set of procedures and operations with which the
scientist uses the data to develop a theory to adequately describe
the phenomena under investigation. This theory is derived from
the data by inductive processes. If the methodology is followed
correctly, the scientist will arrive at an empirically motivated
theory to describe the phenomena under consideration. So, in
this model “the empirical motivation for accepting (or rejecting)
a theory stems from the data which give rise to the theory, i.e.,
the data which played a role in its discovery. In this view, the
discovery of a theory and the justification of a theory are a single
process; discovery and justification cannot be distinguished”
(Dougherty, 1994: 331). On the contrary, in the deductive model
there does not exist a set of procedures and operations with which
the scientist works on the data to discover a theory. Rather, in this
model the theory is a product of human creativity. A theory is a
conjecture advanced as a possible explanation of the phenomena
under investigation. According to Dougherty, “the means by
which a theory is arrived at are irrelevant in determining
its empirical adequacy. The theory derives its total empirical
motivation from the comparison of the consequences deduced
from the theory with observable experimental phenomena.
In this view, the discovery of a theory and the justification
of a theory are two different processes” (Dougherty, 1994:
331). The history of modern science is a clear illustration
of the primacy, in the realm of the natural sciences, of the
deductive method, generally known as the hypothetico-deductive
model (Hempel, 1966 remains an excellent exposition of this
model).
As we know, Chomsky’s naturalistic conception of language
implies the adoption of the hypothetico-deductive method for
linguistic theory. And it can also be argued (as discussed in the
next section) that a good part of the criticisms of Chomskyan
linguistic theory, both past and present, are based on the
conviction that the only way to construct a theory of language
is through an inductive model. In this sense, Cohen (1955)
explained the differences between Einstein and the physicist
Ernst Mach (defender of the inductive model):
“Einstein said he had always believed that the invention of
scientific concepts and the building of theories upon them was
one of the great creative properties of the human mind. His own
view was thus opposed to Mach’s, because Mach assumed that the
laws of science were only an economical way of describing a large
collection of facts” (Cohen, 1955: 73).
In fact, many opponents of the Chomskyan conception of
linguistic theory conceive of the study of language as the
economic systematization of a large collection of linguistic facts.
But in contemporary natural science, scientific theories are not
inductive generalizations from the data (although these are
necessary), but are theoretical constructs (formulated in terms
of hypotheses) that must predict the data. The increase in the
quantity and/or quality of data does not necessarily imply a
radical change in the theory, but may offer a greater opportunity
for its empirical falsification. Therefore, any improvement in the
quantity and quality of observational data will necessarily imply
an improvement in any type of theory, but it is evident that it will
have a far greater impact on an inductive than a deductive theory.
Of course, a hypothetico-deductive theory is not immune
to data (in such a case it would be unfalsifiable and therefore
unscientific). When I affirm that a deductive theory has a higher
threshold of tolerance to the scarcity of data, I mean that it
does not need the same amount of data for the formulation
of a hypothesis as the inductive method does. If we consider
the specific issue that concerns us here, that is, the possibility
of collecting and manipulating enormous amounts of data on
linguistic variation, the impact on a deductive language theory
will again be lower, in this case due to the very nature of the
object of study of the deductive theory of language: the faculty
of language, and not the languages generated by it.
THE NATURE OF THE OBJECT OF STUDY
AND THE METHODOLOGY OF LINGUISTIC
THEORY
The object of study of Chomskyan linguistic theory is not human
languages, but the faculty of language (FL). Of course, no one
speaks FL: people either speak a specific language or they do
not speak at all. Faculty of language (FL) determines part of
the structure of languages, and therefore languages must be
studied in order to discover the structure and properties of FL,
but languages are not the ultimate object of study. Chomsky
expressed this very clearly:
“Thus, what we call ‘English,’ ‘French,’ ‘Spanish,’ and so on,
even under idealizations to idiolects in homogeneous speech
communities, reflect the Norman Conquest, proximity to
Germanic areas, a Basque substratum, and other factors that
cannot seriously be regarded as properties of the language
faculty. Pursuing the obvious reasoning, it is hard to imagine
that the properties of the language faculty—a real object of the
natural world—are instantiated in any observed system. Similar
assumptions are taken for granted in the study of organisms
generally” (Chomsky, 1995: 11, fn. 6).
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And for this reason, the inductive model is simply insufficient
to discover the truth about FL. There is, of course, an inductive
phase in all hypothetico-deductive theories, and therefore, to
a large extent, inductive linguistic theories (such as those
developed by Greenberg and many others) are useful for
deductive linguistic theory, but these two types of theories do
not have the same goals, nor the same objects of study (see
Mendívil-Giró, 2012 for a discussion here).
The differences that these two main traditions show in the
way they approach the issue of the diversity of languages are
not ultimately based on different conceptions of science; rather,
the different conceptions of science are inspired by different
conceptions of the object of study. From a generativist point
of view, language is conceived of as a natural phenomenon,
and languages are understood as particular environmentally
conditioned (and historically modified) manifestations of that
phenomenon. That is, we proceed deductively from language
to languages. One of the clearest examples of this procedure
is parametric theory (Chomsky, 1981; Baker, 2001). Regardless
of the specific formulations that it might take (see Gallego,
2011), the basic logic of parametric theory remains strong:
from common design principles, the various emerging systems
respond to variations in development processes that have
systematic implications, just as happens in the development of
natural organisms.
In contrast, from a functionalist point of view, we proceed
inductively from languages to language. This model implies that
languages exist in themselves and that language is a secondary
concept induced from the descriptive generalizations obtained
from the study of languages. Echoing Bloomfield’s (1933: 20)
assertion (“the only useful generalizations about language are
inductive generalizations”), Dixon considers it to be an error
to think that “linguistic theorizing should be largely deductive,”
arguing that “the most profitable theoretical work is inductive”
(Dixon, 1997: 137). Indeed, there is not much difference here
with what Bloomfield observed 50 years earlier (and that Dixon
quotes): “when we have adequate data about many languages,
we shall have to return to the problem of general grammar
and to explain these similarities and divergences, but this study,
when it comes, will not be speculative but inductive” (Bloomfield,
1933: 20).
Authors in the broad area of functionalism (and also so-
called cognitive linguistics) favor an inductive model of linguistic
theory for one clear reason: they do not consider FL to be a
legitimate object of study. In general, such authors conceive
of languages as cultural objects or institutions that are not the
instantiation of a biologically determined FL, but are objects that
must be studied in themselves and for themselves. As Evans and
Levinson (2010) recommend, “first analyze a language in its own
terms, then compare” (Evans and Levinson, 2010: 2734). This
externalist view explains the adoption of the inductive model
when it comes to relating the theory of language to the study of
languages; it also explains one of the most frequent criticisms of
Chomsky’s hypothetico-deductive model, that of starting from a
reduced sample of data to formulate a theory of language: “We
have no quarrel with abstract analyses per se, but we would like to
see these arise inductively, and not be derived deductively from
a model based on English and familiar languages.” (Evans and
Levinson, 2010: 2754).
It is therefore legitimate to ask (especially in the context of the
present Research Topic) how much data is required to develop
a theory of language. To my knowledge, this issue has not been
discussed widely in the history of our discipline, yet there is a
long tradition of discussing an analogous question (that is, a
qualitatively similar one), as expressed in the title of the following
section.
HOW MANY LANGUAGES DO WE NEED
TO FORMULATE A THEORY OF THE
FACULTY OF LANGUAGE?
In strictly logical terms, this question has only two answers: (i) a
sufficient number of languages or (ii) all languages (the possible
answer “none” is not acceptable, since we would no longer be in
the field of empirical science). And, again in strictly logical terms,
the deductive model would have to choose (i) as a response,
and the inductive model should choose (ii). However, it is clear
that answer (ii) is ineffective, since studying all languages is not
possible: thousands (perhaps tens of thousands) of languages
have been extinguished without a trace, and many of those that
remain are undocumented. As Dixon points out, “there are 2,000
or 3,000 languages, for which we have no decent description”
(1997: 138). Therefore, the truly relevant question is what is
meant by “a sufficient number” for each of the models. Given the
impossibility of option (ii), the inductive approach has developed
protocols to determine representative samples, such as in the
case of typological studies (usually in the direction of maximizing
both genealogical and areal diversity). But we should not ignore
the fact that any selection will be arbitrary and incomplete (and,
therefore, potentially destructive to the inductive model). From
the logic of the deductive method it can be stated that, if it is not
possible to consider all languages, then it is not necessary to study
more than one, so the answer to the question could be: the more
the better, but at least one.
Perhaps this is the reason why Chomsky has argued that,
theoretically, FL could be studied from a single language. The
arguments offered by him and others here have to do, on the one
hand, with practical aspects and, on the other, with theoretical
aspects. On the practical side, it is argued that the first generativist
studies were pioneers of this type of study, and that focusing on
the in-depth analysis of one language to take the first steps toward
understanding the problem was more profitable than a shallower
analysis of a greater number of languages. See Rizzi (1994) and
Newmeyer (1993: 332 ff.) for further developments of this line of
argument. The theoretical arguments are more relevant and, also,
more controversial:
“I have not hesitated to propose a general principle of linguistic
structure on the basis of observation of a single language [...] The
inference is legitimate, assuming that humans are not specifically
adapted to learn one rather than another human language [...]
Assuming that the genetically determined language faculty is a
common human possession, we may conclude that a principle
of language is universal if we are led to postulate it as a
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‘precondition’ for the acquisition of a single language. To set such
a conclusion, we will naturally want to investigate other languages
in comparable detail. We may find that our inference is refuted by
such investigation” (Chomsky, 1979: 48).
Note that although Chomsky admits that it will be necessary to
investigate other languages (in comparable detail), to confirm
or falsify hypotheses, in fact (and again speaking theoretically)
this would not be necessary if we were able to distinguish in
the study of a specific language those of its elements which
derive from the environment and those which emerge from the
organism itself (and which are, therefore, “a ‘precondition’ for
the acquisition”). But, of course, we have no way of doing this
directly, and hence, for such an objective the consideration of
language diversity is essential as a means of refining the theory.
Verifying the formal properties in which languages (or dialects)
differ has a very directly bearing on what aspects of language are
not fixed by nature.
In any case, there is one important point to note here: whereas
it is clear that the consideration of linguistic typology (and of
linguistic diversity in general) is crucial for the development
of a theory of FL, this does not imply that we should accept,
as functionalists do, that the theory of language must be
inductive.
Actually, Chomsky (1985: 40 ff.) has argued, form a deductive
point of view, that the study of one language can provide
crucial data concerning the structure of another, that is, if we
continue to accept the plausible assumption that the ability to
acquire language is common to the species. Thus, according
to Chomsky, a study of English is a study of the realization
of the initial state S0 under particular conditions. The study
therefore involves assumptions regarding S0 that must be made
explicit. But if S0 is constant, Japanese, for example, is an
instantiation of the same initial state under different conditions.
Research on Japanese can show that the assumptions about
S0 derived from the study of English were incorrect, as these
assumptions may give conflicting results for Japanese. Therefore,
after correcting these assumptions, we may be forced to modify
the grammar postulated for English. Since the consideration of
Japanese data is relevant in terms of the adequacy of a theory
of S0, it can have an indirect weight on the choice of grammar
adopted in an attempt to characterize English; indeed this is
a common practice in the tradition of generative grammar.
Thus, Rizzi (1994: 404) analyses Chomsky’s consideration of
English to establish the so-called “finite sentence condition.”
This restriction stipulates that finite sentences have certain island
properties that would explain, for example, that in (1) the
anaphoric expression in the subject position of the embedded
finite sentence cannot have a noun phrase outside of the sentence
as an antecedent, but that this does happen in the non-finite
sentence in (2):
(1) ∗Mary saw [that herself won the prize] on TV
(2) Mary saw [herself win the prize] on TV
Rizzi observes that the same happens in Italian and other
languages. However, he also points out that later work on
Portuguese and Turkish led to the refinement of this condition,
which does not seem unique to finiteness, but depends on
whether there is agreement between subject and verb. Given
that in Portuguese and Turkish, tense and agreement do not
necessarily coincide, it can be observed that, for example in
Portuguese, there are infinitives that agree with the subject
and behave like finite sentences in English such as (1). Rizzi
concludes: “The correct generalization could not have been
determined on the basis of data from English alone, since
in this language it is obscured by the essential overlap of
the two notions of finiteness and agreement” (Rizzi, 1994:
404).
Even so, this does not imply that a theory of language
must necessarily be inductive, as Comrie (1981) suggests. For
Comrie the idea that the study of a language can serve to
discover universal properties of language is unacceptable, and
defends Greenberg’s option that in order to establish something
as universal in language it would be necessary to consider a
wide variety of languages. Comrie recognizes the coherence of
Chomsky’s position, and makes a useful comparison with other
sciences:
“[I]f one wanted to study the chemical properties of iron, then
presumably one would concentrate on analyzing a single sample
of iron, rather than on analyzing vast numbers of pieces of
iron, still less attempting to obtain a representative sample of
the world’s iron. This simply reflects our knowledge (based,
presumably, on experience) that all instances of a given substance
are homogeneous with respect to their chemical properties”
(1981: 6).
According to Comrie, this assumption of uniformity cannot
be applied in the study of linguistic universals. He rejects the
comparison with iron as being inadequate, and proposes another
one, which is very symptomatic:
“On the other hand, if one wanted to study human behavior under
stress, then presumably one would not concentrate on analyzing
the behavior of just a single individual, since we know from
experience that different people behave differently under similar
conditions of stress, i.e., if one wanted to make generalizations
about over-all tendencies in human behavior under stress it would
be necessary to work with a representative sample of individuals”
(Comrie, 1981: 6).
Which example best fits linguistic theory, that of the study of
iron or that of the study of human behavior under stress? It
seems that the choice depends on the way in which the object
of study is conceived: the faculty of language (“a real object of
the natural world”) or languages themselves (its manifestations).
As Newmeyer suggests, taking the example of stress, “Comrie
has unwittingly suggested an even more appropriate analogy:
generativists study the neurophysiology of stress, typologists its
behavioral manifestations” (Newmeyer, 1983: 337). In fact, as I
have already pointed out, they are not incompatible conceptions,
but complementary ones.
Comrie justifies his preference by assuming that if what “we
want to find out in work on language universals is the range of
variation found across languages and the limits placed on this
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variation, it would be a serious methodological error to build
into our research programme aphoristic assumptions about the
range of variation” (Comrie, 1981: 6). Yet we must note here that
the goal of Chomskyan linguistic theory is not to discover the
range of variation found across languages and the limits placed on
this variation, since it does not constitute an inductive approach.
As Chomsky himself pointed out, any theory of the Universal
Grammar (UG) must meet two conditions:
“On the one hand it must be compatible with the diversity of
existing (indeed, possible) grammars. At the same time, UG must
be sufficiently constrained and restrictive in the options it permits
so as to account for the fact that each of these grammars develops
in the mind on the basis of quite limited evidence” (Chomsky,
1981: 3).
The assumption of uniformity is not therefore a methodological
error, but one of the factors that must restrict the form of
a hypothetico-deductive theory of language. It is important
to recall that another Chomskyan idealization that has been
misunderstood, and that is directly related to the problem at
hand, is the notion of the ideal speaker-hearer as an object of
study:
“Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-
listener, in a completely homogenous speech-community [. . . ].
This seems to me to have been the position of the founders of
modern general linguistics, and no cogent reason for modifying
it has been offered. To study actual linguistic performance, we
must consider the interaction of a variety of factors, of which
the underlying competence of the speaker-hearer is only one.
In this respect, study of language is no different from empirical
investigation of other complex phenomena” (Chomsky, 1965:
3–4).
The rejection of this idealization (see, for example, Botha, 1989)
is once again based on not distinguishing between the two
models described. From the deductive point of view, individual
variation is irrelevant and a homogeneous speaking community
(which obviously does not exist) is assumed, precisely because
what one wants to discover does not depend on individual
linguistic performance. As Chomsky (1980) pointed out in
his own defense, idealization would only be inadequate if it
were shown that people cannot acquire their language in a
homogeneous linguistic community or that linguistic variation
is an essential key to the process of language acquisition. None
of these ideas seems to make sense. Note that the Saussurean
concept of langue, defined as “la somme des images verbales
emmagasinées chez tous les individus” (de Saussure, 1916: 30),
also implies an idealization that eliminates individual differences
in a linguistic community. As we have seen, from the deductive
point of view the difference between two dialects of a language
and between two different languages is in fact a matter of
degree, not of kind. And for that reason I believe that this
old controversy is relevant to the subject that concerns us
here.
Comrie explicitly assumes in the excerpt quoted above that
the goal of typologists is to discover “the range of variation
found across languages and the limits placed on this variation,”
that is, an inductive study from a set of facts; meanwhile,
Chomsky’s stance implies that variation is only of interest as a
source of empirical testing for the theory of FL, in a deductive
sense.
CONCLUSIONS
An inductive theory is essentially determined by the data from
which it is obtained. The more detailed the description of
linguistic variation, the more complex the theory becomes. A
deductive theory, rather, is by definition less dependent on the
data, although obviously it must have empirical support. As
a consequence, inductive models tend to emphasize diversity
to the detriment of language uniformity, as the programmatic
article by Evans and Levinson (2009) explicitly shows. In
contrast, deductive models, such as generative grammar, tend to
consider linguistic diversity as superficial and largely confined
to the components of language externalization (see, for example,
Berwick and Chomsky, 2011).
Undoubtedly, a greater knowledge of the range of (intra-
linguistic and inter-linguistic) variation provided by new
technologies may provide greater opportunities for the
formulation of specific hypotheses within the theory of language
and, especially, a greater empirical basis for its falsification (see
Garzonio and Poletto, 2018 for a suggestive approach). But the
advent of Big Data is unlikely to involve a revolution in syntactic
theory analogous to the one witnessed in the application of
the hypothetico-deductive model of the natural sciences to
language.
It may be appropriate to recall that the development of
generative grammar introduced a new perspective in the study
of language. Since Chomsky’s first contributions (e.g., Chomsky,
1957) a grammar is no longer understood as a more or less
systematic description of a language, but is a theory of a
language, and, as such, that theory is subject in its construction
and evaluation to the same restrictions and principles that any
other scientific theory. What Chomsky pushed was, therefore,
a radical change of perspective in linguistics (and in cognitive
science in general): from the study of behavior and behavioral
outcomes, to the study of mental systems of computation and
representation. And, as one reviewer suggests, it is interesting
to highlight the relationship between the controversy I have
reviewed within linguistic theory and the recent crisis replication
within psychology and cognitive science (see Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). Thus, Smith and Little (2018) argue that
the strategy against the replication crisis should not necessarily
be to increase the size of samples (for example with much larger
samples of participants), but to favor studies with smaller and
qualitatively significant samples:
“We argue that some of the most robust, valuable, and enduring
findings in psychology were obtained, not using statistical
inference on large samples, but using small-N designs in which
a large number of observations are made on a relatively small
number of experimental participants” (Smith and Little, 2018:
2084).
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Yang’s (2016) equation shows that the mechanisms of child
language acquisition seem to be designed to optimize learning
in a context of limited exposure to data, since the smaller the
amount of data in the learner’s linguistic experience, the greater
the tolerance of exceptions for the induction of productive rules.
On the other hand, in a curiously analogous way, a deductive
syntactic theory has a greater ability to overcome the data on
linguistic variation in looking for the invariant principles of the
human faculty of language, its primary object of study.
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